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I Comments I
Changing of the Guard: A United Nations
Security Council Decision on a Uniform
Airport Security Standard for Member
Nations
Corey J. Adamson*
Millions of travelers pass through airport security everyday, both for
national and international flights. Depending on the level of security,
and how rigorously security measures are implemented, these travelers
may be required to remove their shoes, have their laptops tested, and
have their carry-on bags thoroughly searched. However, despite such
measures, terrorists still manage to wreak havoc aboard flights, both
nationally and internationally.1 This ineffectiveness of airport security is
not only evident in the United States, 2 but in other countries, including
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2006; B.A., Philosophy and Psychology, Duquesne University, 2002. The
author wishes to thank his parents, for making it all possible, and to the little red-headed
girl, who has given this Charlie Brown much love and support, and is much loved in
return.
1. See generally RODNEY WALLIS, How SAFE ARE OuR SKIES? ASSESSING THE
AIRLINES' RESPONSE TO TERRORISM (2003) (discussing, in detail, a number of terrorist
attacks on civil aviation, including September 1 th, and the security measures in place
prior to the events and those enacted after).
2. See Matthew L. Wald, Airport Screening Still Falls Short, Tests Find, N.Y.
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Russia.3 It seems that in every country, the standard of security, what is
required to pass through the screening gates, differs.4 Conflicting
standards create diverse levels of security, and too much differentiation
translates into danger for international security, because it will not take
terrorists long to determine where airport security is least effective and
utilize these weaknesses to continue to use civil aviation as a means of
inflicting terror. The international community has recognized terrorism
in the field of civil aviation for some time. Kofi Annan, the Secretary
General of the United Nations, has called upon the international
community to come together to combat the menace of terrorism.
6
Unfortunately, terrorism remains a very real threat to air travel.
The primary impetus of this Comment is the terrorist attack of
September 11, 2001, where airport security arguably suffered its worst
failure. Four of the five Flight 77 hijackers set off metal detectors before
being allowed to board the plane that crashed into the Pentagon; 7 two of
them set off the detectors twice, were scanned with handheld wands, and
then were allowed to board.8 When utility knives were discovered as
they passed through security, the hijackers were not questioned by the
security screeners at Dulles International Airport. 9 One of the terrorists
had even been added to a terrorism watch list compiled by the U.S.
government.10 Three of the four hijacked planes were crashed into
buildings that day, killing all on board and many more in the buildings
themselves.
The potential for such tragedy has increased due to the greater
volume of travel11 and the introduction of larger commercial aircrafts.
TIMES, Sept. 24, 2004, at A18.
3. See C.J. Chivers, Russians Cite Porous Security in Jet Bombings, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 16, 2004, at Al.
4. See WALLIS, supra note 1, at 65.
5. See, e.g., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565. The Convention was originally aimed at
combating attacks onboard aircraft, and its scope was widened in 1988 to cover attacks
on airports. See WALLIS, supra note 1, at 62.
6. See What is the UN doing to combat terrorism?, available at http://www.un.org/
geninfo/faq/factsheets/fs8.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2005).
7. See Siri Agrell, Hijackers Set Off Alarms, Still Allowed on Plane: Flight 77
Crashed into Pentagon Minutes Later, NAT'L POST, July 22, 2004, at Al, available at
2004 WL 85153535.
8. Id. Security personnel directed the two hijackers to another area, where one of
their bags was examined, and subsequently the hijackers were cleared to board. Id.
9. See Airport Screeners Let Hijackers Board with Utility Knives, KITCHENER-
WATERLOO REC. (Can.), July 23, 2004, at A9.
10. Id. At the airport, the hijacker faced additional scrutiny because he could not
understand English and because the screener found him to be suspicious. In spite of this,
he was eventually allowed to pass through. Id.
11. See Jack H. Daniel III, Comment, Reform in Airport Security: Panic or
Precaution?, 53 MERCER L. REV. 1623, 1624 (2002).
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Recently, in Europe, a colossal new plane was introduced that seats up to
555 people, has a 262-foot wingspan, and at maximum capacity would
weigh 1.2 million pounds.' 2  The destruction and loss of life that
terrorists could inflict if they ever secured control of such a massive
aircraft is unimaginable; but with marginal airport security, such an
occurrence is not unthinkable.
Horrendous events like the September 1 1 th attacks are often
followed by legislative action focused on improving airport security.'
3
Even with these measures aimed at improvement, the potential for more
attacks is enormous. This Comment proposes a globally uniform
standard of airport security. Further, this Comment suggests that the best
means to achieve this is for the United Nations Security Council to
determine an effective system of airport security and to require
compliance with this system through the issuance of a resolution. Part I
of this Comment examines the weaknesses of individual airport security
systems and the results of ineffective security. The power and authority
of the United Nations Security Council to establish a uniform standard of
airport security for all United Nations member nations is discussed in
Part II, followed by a proposed framework for a global airport security
standard in Part III. Part IV concludes the Comment.
I. An Examination of Problems in Member Nations' Airport Security
Every nation has an interest in its airport security, whether it has
been victim of terrorist attacks or it has maintained safe civil aviation
standards. However, security measures that prevent terrorists from ever
boarding an aircraft vary across the globe.
A. United States Airport Security
Approximately two months after the September 1 1th attacks on the
United States, President Bush signed the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act of 2001 (ATSA), which Congress passed specifically to
improve security in airports and on-board airliners. 14 The ATSA created
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), whose main function
is to screen passengers and their baggage to ensure safety throughout
United States airports. 15 For the first time in United States history, civil
12. See Mark Landler, Airbus Unveils A380, a Giant Fit for 555, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
19, 2005, at Cl. The Airbus A380 also has a fuel capacity of almost eighty-two thousand
gallons. Id.
13. See Daniel III, supra note 11, at 1624 (discussing other terrorist attacks that
utilized aircraft).
14. See THE U.S. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 10 (Steven L. Labov
ed., Mason Crest Publishers 2003).
15. Id.
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aviation security for all 429 commercial airports became a direct federal
responsibility. 16  In addition to reinventing its own airport security
system, the United States government has helped foreign countries
implement changes to meet international aviation security standards. 7
Unfortunately, despite the creation of a new governmental entity,
problems in airport security in the United States persist. In several
undercover government tests, federal airport screeners and luggage
inspectors missed knives and guns. 18 In addition, one out of every four
fake bombs inspectors attempted to sneak through security checkpoints
during weekly tests over a four month period.' 9 At New Jersey's Newark
Liberty International Airport, screeners found a fake bomb during a
training exercise and then lost it.20  Another test by the Government
Accountability Office found that undercover agents slipped guns, knives,
21and box cutters past security screeners.
Even individuals who are not allowed to board an aircraft have
managed to evade security screeners Recently, the singer formerly
known as Cat Stevens (now known as Yusuf Islam after becoming a
Muslim) boarded a United Airlines aircraft despite being on a "no-fly"
list.23 For any individual who is on the "no-fly" list, airline officials must
stop individuals at the gate, but by the time Stevens' name raised a "red
flag" with officials, his plane had already taken off with him on board.2 4
Ineptitude at the security gates is not the TSA's only problem.
25
First, the administration will pay more than $1.5 million to nearly 15,000
airline passengers who have claimed that items in their checked baggage
16. Id.
17. Id. at 57. This support from the United States suggests it would cooperate were
the Security Council to establish a uniform standard of airport security and require United
Nations members' conformance. The U.S.'s cooperation is discussed more in Part IV.
18. See Wald, supra note 2.
19. See Ron Marsico, Screeners Missed 24.8% of Fake Bombs, Reports Say,
PATRIOT NEWS (Harrisburg), Oct. 8, 2004, at A4.
20. See Newark Airport Screeners Spot-Then Lose-Fake Bomb, Dow JONES INT'L
NEWS, Dec. 15, 2004, available at Westlaw, 12/15/04 DJINS 17:24:00. One of the
September 11 flights departed from Newark International Airport. Id.
21. See Mimi Hall, Airport Screeners Missed Weapons, USA TODAY, Sept. 23,
2004, at IA.
22. See Tom Vanden Brook, Jet Diverted After Singer's Name Comes up on Watch
List, USA TODAY, Sept. 22, 2004, at A2.
23. Id.
24. See Shannon McCaffrey, Singer's Possible Terror Ties Bring Deportation,
PATRIOT NEWS (Harrisburg), Sept. 23, 2003, at A9.
25. Perhaps in recognizing that something needed to be done, Congress agreed on
September 29, 2005, four years after putting the federal government in charge of airport
security, to allow airports to employ private security companies to run airport security
checkpoints. See Thomas Frank, Lawmakers to Encourage Private Airport Security
Screeners, USA TODAY, Oct. 5, 2005, at 3A.
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were stolen or damaged during its first eighteen months of existence.26
In fact, as of August 2004, more than twenty TSA baggage screeners at
three major airports had been charged with stealing from checked bags.27
Second, screening personnel are not properly distributed between
airports in order to maximize efficiency and security. For example,
Nevada's Elko Regional Airport has only fifteen flights a day, but had
fourteen TSA screeners.28 Lastly, the TSA experienced an embarrassing
situation when female passengers complained of screeners touching them
between their breasts during pat-downs. 29 Now, screeners have been told
to keep their hands within a "chest perimeter" when the roughly 2
million passengers a week are patted down.3°
B. Other Nations' Airport Security
The United States is not the only country that experiences problems
with airport security. In August 2004, two Chechen women killed
themselves and eighty-eight others in the bombings of two Russian
passenger jets.3 ' One of the Chechen's had provided only her first initial
and last name when she booked her ticket.32 Although the women had
been detained in the Russian airport shortly before boarding, both were
released by a police supervisor, and one bribed her way onto the aircraft
she subsequently exploded.3 3 The police supervisor responsible for
antiterrorism operations, who was to examine their belongings and check
them for potential involvement in terrorist organizations, had allowed
them to board without any checks.34
The United Kingdom's system of airport security is plagued as well.
One television news reporter passed through security at Heathrow
Airport, gained access to secret security plans, and used them to find a
26. See Matthew L. Wald, U.S. to Pay Fliers $1.5 Million for Pilfering of Checked
Bags, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2004, at A20.
27. See Joe Sharkey, When Checked Bags Are Checked by Thieves, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 31, 2004, at C8.
28. See Sally B. Donnelly, Balking at the TSA, TIME (Can. Ed.), Dec. 13, 2004, at 7,
available at 2004 WL 66283497. Elko Regional Airport was the first in the U.S. to apply
to get terminate TSA screeners and return to private employees. Id.
29. See U.S. Airport Security Told Where to Pat, GUELPH MERCURY (Ontario), Dec.
23, 2004, at B13, available at 2004 WL 99761879.
30. Id. More frequent and thorough pat downs had been implemented by the TSA
because two Russian plane explosions that occurred after two Chechen women carried
explosives on board. It is unknown where the women hid the explosives. Id.
31. See Chivers, supra note 3.
32. See David McHugh, Traces of Explosives Also in Second Plane, WINNIPEG FREE
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route onto the runway.35 Another reporter went undercover for an
expose and became a security officer at Manchester Airport.36 This
reporter revealed security lapses, false records, and malfunctioning
equipment.37  For Pakistan International Airlines' flights, 1,000
passengers went through the airport, and only three random bag searches
were performed.38 Her report also revealed that airport personnel left
aircrafts on the runway unattended and unlocked, and there was
widespread disregard for security gates.39
Canada, too, has its share of airport security woes. Security is
primarily left to local police forces, which prevents a uniform,
cooperative approach to airport security in the country.4° While the
Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (the Canadian equivalent to
the TSA) oversees approximately 4,000 screeners, 41 89 designated
airport authorities in Canada are not required to report to any higher
authority.42 These designated airport agencies are primarily concerned
with maximizing their revenue and have lobbied the Canadian federal
government for the right to "set up their own rent-a-cop police forces."
43
Effective airport security requires more than a "rent-a-cop" force. Any
skeptic need only go to any large mall in a big city and observe the
security guards there, and the respect (or, more realistically, the lack
thereof) given to them by mall patrons.
Canada has bigger problems than "rent-a-cops," however. At
Halifax International Airport, three separate incidents involving security
breaches have occurred in a three month period.44 Air cargo is not
systematically screened.45 In perhaps the most alarming incident, over
1,000 airport security uniforms, including badges, went missing late last
35. See Mike Francis, Sky News Reporter Demonstrates how Security Breached at
Heathrow Airport, London, After Lifting Sensitive Document, IRN NEWS, Dec. 4, 2004,
available at 2004 WL 96941049. Heathrow Airport is one of the busiest airports in the
world, and should thus be one of the most secure. Id. Such a grand failure by the
security personnel is inexcusable.
36. See Brian Courtis, Security Alert from the Inside, THE AGE, Jan. 11, 2005, at A3,
available at 2005 WL 55814827.
37. Id. Her supervisor continuously tested a metal detector that failed to detect a
butterfly knife, with a blade of 20 centimeters. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See Colin Kenny, Why Our Airports Still Scare Me, NAT'L POST (Can.), July 13,
2004, at A14, available at 2004 WL 85151880.
41. See Brian Daly, Number of Items Seized at Airports Nears Million Mark, GLOBE
& MAIL (Toronto), July 19, 2004, at A6.
42. See Kenny, supra note 40.
43. Id.
44. See Airport Security Breach Delays Passengers, KITCHENER-WATERLOO REC.
(Can.), Sept. 27, 2004, at A5, available at 2004 WL 93626332.
45. See Daly, supra note 41.
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year.46 If terrorists were to obtain these uniforms and badges, they could
gain access to secure areas of Canadian airports and cause severe damage
and loss of life. Preventing casualties and damage is the primary purpose
of airport security. If this goal is achieved and maintained, a uniform
global standard is needed.
II. United Nations Security Council's Authority and Power to Take the
Initiative in Airport Security
The powers of the United Nations and its principal organs are
created by the United Nations Charter.47 The Preamble to the Charter
states that the "peoples" of the United Nations are
determined... to promote social progress and better standards of life
in larger freedom.... and for [this] end[] unite our strength to
maintain international peace and security... to employ international
machinery for the promotion of the economic and social
advancement of all peoples... land] have resolved to combine our
efforts to accomplish these aims.
U.N. purposes also include maintaining international peace and security;
taking effective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to
peace;49 achieving international cooperation in solving problems of an
economic or social character; 50 and serving as the center for harmonizing
the actions of nations in attaining these common goals.51 Safety in
member nations' civil aviation is crucial to maintaining a sense of
security both nationally 52 and internationally; if terrorists succeed in
causing further chaos by aircraft hijackings, international travel by
aircraft would become increasingly burdensome, if not impossible, and
the global economic market would be drastically affected.
The Security Council is the primary organ of the United Nations
that deals with terrorist threats, and thus, the organ best equipped to craft
a global standard of airport security.5 3 U.N. member nations are
responsible for accepting and carrying out any measure that the Security
46. See Elizabeth Thompson, Angry Minister Demands Report on Air Security,
WINNIPEG FREE PREss, Dec. 5, 2004, at A5, available at 2004 WL 98930438.
47. For the powers of the Security Council generally, see U.N. CHARTER, arts. 39-5 1.
48. U.N. CHARTER, pmbl.
49. Id. at art. 1, para. 1.
50. Id. at art. 1, para. 3.
51. Id. at art. 1, para. 4.
52. See, e.g., Canadian Air Transport Security Act, S.C. 2002, c. 9, Pt. I, s. 27 ("The
provision of screening at an [airport] is conclusively deemed for all purposes to be a
service that is necessary to prevent immediate and serious danger to the safety of the
public.").
53. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 1.
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Council adopts,54 because the U.N. Security Council is the only U.N.
body whose resolutions are legally binding on member nations.55 The
member nations, naturally, vest the Security Council with the primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.56
Thus, if the U.N. Security Council were to pass a resolution that created
a uniform standard of airport security for all U.N. member nations, each
member nation would be obliged to comply with the resolution.
The Security Council, if it determines that a threat to "the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression" exists, may make
recommendations 57 or decide what measures, not involving the use of
armed forces, are to be employed to give effect to its decisions. It may
also call upon member nations to apply such measures.58 The Council
even has power to determine which member nations are required to carry
out its decisions. 59 Once the Council decides this, those member nations
are required to act not only directly, but also through any appropriate
international agencies of which they are members,60 and to join in
providing assistance in carrying out such measures.
61
Some legal scholars and political experts have argued that the
Council is severely hampered because any of the five permanent
members of the Council can veto any decision. This veto power has
arguably led to a "paralysis" of the Council in the exercise of its supreme
mandate to maintain international peace and security.62  Although the
five permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, the
Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States) 63 could
block 64 the adoption of the resolutions necessary to establish a uniform
global standard of airport security, they publicly and officially agree that
only through joint efforts can they hope to stop or reduce terrorism.
65
Therefore, the Council could, and should, recognize the lack of a global
54. Id. at art. 25.
55. See e.g., LINDA FASULO, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE UN (2004).
56. Id. at art. 24, 1.
57. U.N. CHARTER, art. 39.
58. 1d. at art. 41.
59. Id. at art. 48, 1.
60. Id. at art. 48, 2. For a Security Council resolution to be binding, it must be a
decision, utilizing the language "member nations shall ... ," and not merely a
recommendation. Id. at art. 24-25. See also THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & SEAN D.
MURPHY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 2-7; 3-14 (3d ed. 2002).
61. Id. at art. 49.
62. See Erik Suy, Is the United Nations Security Council Still Relevant? And Was it
Ever?, 12 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 7, 13 (2004).
63. See U.N. CHARTER art. 23, 1.
64. See id. at art. 27, 3 ("Decisions of the Security Council on all [non-procedural]
matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including concurring votes
of the permanent members.").
65. See FASULO, supra note 56, at 80.
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standard for airport security as a real and pervasive threat to international
security and adopt a resolution whereby it assumes responsibility for
implementing such a standard through a uniform global airport security
system.
Still, the international community has been expressed some concern
regarding the boundaries of the Council's power. As Judge Gros has
commented:
[C]ertain limits on the powers of the Security Council are necessary
because of the all too great ease with which any acutely controversial
international situation can be represented as involving a latent threat
to peace and security, even where it is really too remote genuinely to
constitute one... [w]ithout these limitations, the functions of the
Security Council could be used for purposes never originally
intended.
66
However, in the above situation, member nations were using the
Security Council to achieve ulterior motives, and there was "no threat to
peace and security other than such as might be artificially as a pretext for
the realization of ulterior purposes., 67 Considering the relaxed airport
security and the very real "threat to peace and security" imposed thereby,
and considering further that the proposed global airport security would
be a Council initiated and sponsored effort, there leaves little room for
any "ulterior purpose."
The Security Council's response to the September 1 1 th attacks has
implicitly recognized a need for better security. The day after the
attacks, the Council passed Resolution 1368.68 The Resolution
appropriately espoused outrage in response to the attacks, but admittedly,
it essentially amounted to a more strongly worded rephrasing of prior
resolutions, which stopped just short of referring to international acts of
terrorism as a threat to international peace and security.69 Resolution
1269 pledged a common fight against terrorists everywhere and specified
that member states should share information and refuse to provide a safe-
haven for terrorists. 70 Implicit in this command is that terrorists must not
be allowed safe passage onboard civilian aircrafts, for what good is a
refusal to provide a haven for such individuals if countries allow them to
66. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (Southwest Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (S.
Afr. v. Namib), 1971 ICJ 16 (June 21) (Gros, J., dissenting).
67. Id.
68. See S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1368 (2001).
69. See S.C. Res. 1269, U.N. SCOR 55th Sess., 4053rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1269
(1999).
70. See FASULO, supra note 56, at 81.
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reach a safe haven because of poor airport security?
Seventeen days after the attacks, the Council adopted Resolution
1373,71 which called upon members to "work together urgently to
prevent and suppress terrorist acts, including through increased
cooperation and full implementation of the international conventions
relating to terrorism 72 ... [and to] find ways of intensifying and
accelerating the exchange of operational information, especially
regarding actions or movements of terrorist persons or networks., 73 It
also decided that all members "shall . . . take the necessary steps to
prevent the commission of terrorist acts.. . [and] prevent the movement
of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls., 74 Arguably,
this Resolution instructed member nations to exchange information
regarding terrorist movement and to improve all programs that would
undermine terrorist efforts.
The author has proposed a global airport security network, headed
by the most powerful international organization. All member nations'
information on terrorist cell movements is shared through a central body.
Global "no-fly" lists and warnings are issued instantly, because all
relevant information has been analyzed and networked by a central body.
Individuals and their luggage are carefully screened under a uniform set
of guidelines, regardless of destination or the passenger's national origin.
There is no better way to implement Resolution 1373 than the
scenario described above. All member nations would comply with a
Security Council Resolution in which the Council mandates a uniform
standard of airport security for all member nations. This would
necessitate the sharing of information regarding terrorist movements.
Such a system would enable instant identification of suspected terrorists
or "red-flagged" individuals attempting to board an aircraft.
It must be noted that this monumental task would not be left to the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the world's leader in
determining policies to prevent terrorist attacks using commercial
airliners.75  Part of the ICAO's general mandate is to develop
international standards for aviation safety, and in 2002, it approved a
security plan that includes regular audits of airport security.7 6 However,
the ICAO is not part of the U.N., and its policies are not binding law.77
71. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373
(2001).
72. Id. at 1.
73. Id. at 3.
74. Id. at 2.
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Therefore, for meaningful change, the U.N. Security Council must take
charge.
A required standard for uniform airport security for all member
nations would allow the U.N. to reestablish the international strength and
legitimacy that it may have lost as a result of recent international events,
including the United States' invasion of Iraq. By addressing the problem
of varied standards of airport security, and providing the workable
solution of a uniform standard, the U.N. has a unique opportunity to save
lives, to provide security for all member nations, and to strengthen the
institution. The Council has already expressed a desire to implement this
effort.78 Indeed, the drafters of the U.N. Charter meant for the Security
Council to serve as the "teeth of the United Nations. 79
By instituting a uniform airport security standard, the U.N. would
reassert its vision of the international community and act as the
mechanism for a global entity of leadership concerned with the common
good. Furthermore, the U.N. could reestablish its moral strength of
leadership, reaffirm its goal to protect all member nations, and solidify
its legitimacy. By devising a standard of airport security for all member
nations, and calling upon them for help and support, the U.N. would
demonstrate that it has a critical stake in enhancing the security, freedom,
and economic well-being of all nations around the globe.
Of course, in order for this vision to be realized, the Council needs
to pass a resolution with some muster. Decisions made by the Security
Council with respect to international security issues are crafted in the
form of either recommendations or as binding decisions.8 ° Political
considerations have led the Council to favor non-binding
recommendations rather than binding decisions.8'
Although it undoubtedly strengthens the Council's political position
when it "supports" and "commends" efforts to promote universal
participation in anti-terrorism programs82 and to "affirm" long-term and
78. S.C. Res. 1456, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4688th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc S/RES/1456
(2003).
79. The Charter of the United Nations: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1945) (report to the President by the
Secretary of State), cited in Maury D. Shenk, The United Nations Security Council
Consultation Act: a Proposal for Multilateral Resolution of Internal Conflict, 28 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 247, 250 (1991).
80. U.N. CHARTER, art. 39.
81. See Shenk, supra note 79, at 250. Political considerations include a tendency to
avoid demanding action because of political sensitivities and a desire to maintain Security
Council prestige by not requiring actions that nations are unlikely to execute. Id.
However, it is this author's position that a need for a strong airport security system
transcends any politically sensitive issues, and that demanding all member nations
conform to a uniform standard will restore some vigor to the Council.
82. S.C. Res. 1269, supra note 69, at 1.
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inclusive approaches in the international community as essential to
fighting terrorism,8 3 a more forceful action is needed from the Council.
The Council has repeatedly "reaffirmed" the great horrors and immense
impact of terrorist acts and the need to combat them.84 The time for the
politically gratifying pacifism of "reaffirming" has passed; the time for
decisive binding action is now.
In reality, the Council has already laid the foundation for such a
binding decision in the resolutions discussed above. The Council needs
to take these groundwork resolutions to their logical conclusion.
Resolution 137385 established the Counter Terrorism Committee to
oversee the enforcement of the binding decision that all member nations
"take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts,"
86
and after a period of monitoring the member nations, directed it to
"intensify its efforts to promote" the application of Resolution 1373 by
the member nations.
87
The Counter Terrorism Committee should develop the uniform
airport security standards because it is responsible for monitoring
member nations' compliance with Resolution 1373 and collecting
relevant information.88 The Committee, charged with ensuring that all
member nations observe their "formal obligations. .. [in the] ambitious
task of raising the ... level of government performance against terrorism
all over the world,, 89 is logically the body that should develop a uniform
global airport security plan for the Security Council's approval and
adoption.
The Committee identified as an essential stage of implementation of
Resolution 1373 that all member nations should have appropriate and
83. S.C. Res. 1377, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4413th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc S/RES/1377
(2001).
84. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1456, supra note 78; S.C. Res. 1526, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess.,
4908th mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/1526 (2004); S.C. Res. 1566, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess.,
5053rd mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/1566 (2004).
85. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 71, at 3.
86. Id. at2.
87. S.C. Res. 1456, supra note 78, at 3. The Security Council also made it a matter
of priority for the Committee's work in close cooperation with other international
organizations to better monitor this implementation of Resolution 1373 a priority. See
S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 84, at 2.
88. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 71, at 3.
89. REPORT BY THE CHAIR OF THE COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMITTEE ON THE
PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
1373(2001), at 4, U.N. Doc. S/2004/70 (2004). The report discusses the difficulties with
the Committee must deal with in their gathering of information and monitoring of
member nations; most prominent is that the Committee does not directly provide
technical assistance to member nations. The report finds it to be critical that the
Committee play a more proactive role. Id. at 8-9.
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adequate legislation enacted to combat terrorism. 90 Thus, the Committee
could gather information on the security systems in place in member
nations, study their effectiveness, and establish a uniform global standard
for airport security based on these findings. The Committee has already
asked the Security Council to set clear directions for its future, deepen its
efforts to promote implementation of Resolution 1373, strengthen its
ability to provide assistance to member nations, and improve its capacity
to make recommendations to the Council. 91
The Council could accomplish all of those goals by passing a
resolution directing the Committee to develop a global uniform system of
airport security, based on the information it has already collected and on
subsequent information it will collect pursuant to that resolution. Once
the Committee developed the uniform system, it would submit its
recommendations for a standard to the Council for approval. Once
approved, the Council would then pass another resolution directing all
member nations to conform to this standard, and directing the Committee
to aid them in doing so, in accordance with the directives expressed in
Resolution 1373. If need be, the Security Council could also reaffirm the
importance of these directives, and express its mindfulness of the
necessity of international cooperation to combat terrorism, and recognize
the need for a global uniform standard of airport security.
III. A Suggested Framework for the Uniform Global Airport Security
Standard
The most important starting point for a uniform standard of airport
security should be identifying and implementing its primary objective:
stopping terrorists from using civil aviation for their ends. To do this,
each person passing through a screening point or boarding an airplane
must receive the same treatment. Failure to treat people in a uniform
manner bolsters holes in the system that terrorists could exploit, leading
to more tragedy. Checks based on visual profiles would momentarily
prevent terrorists from boarding because invariably, terrorists would
either recruit members who do not fit the profiles or use elaborate
disguises. Therefore, uniformity in treatment is an important objective.
As discussed above, the Counter Terrorism Committee would
90. Id. at 10.
91. LETTER DATED 19 FEBRUARY 2004 FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1373 (2001) CONCERNING
COUNTER TERRORISM ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, at 3-4,
U.N. Doc. S/2004/124 (2004). This letter came a month after the Committee Chair's
report on the need for the Committee to be more proactive. It asks the Security Council
to almost completely restructure the Committee so as to allow it to be more proactive in
assisting member nations. Id.
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gather information before devising a uniform standard. Inherent in this
collection process is examining and cooperating with other international
organizations.92  The International Civil Aviation Organization's 93
recommended screening setup is a logical staring place. Under the
recommended setup, each "team" unit at any airport gate would consist
of a five member team of screeners who rotate positions, along with
equipment, every twenty minutes. 94  The x-ray unit for hand-carried
items would be positioned next to a walk-through metal detector (known
as a magnetometer) for passenger screening.95 One member would direct
the flow of hand baggage, while another would monitor the video
display, which reveals the items being x-rayed.96 The third member hand
would search any items selected during the x-ray process for further
examination, and the fourth would control the movement of passengers
through the magnetometer. The fifth member would manually frisk
those passengers who trigger the magnemometer's alarm. 97 The fifth
member may use a hand-held metal detector as a frisking aid.98
While gathering information, the Committee would also examine
the measures member nations currently have in place to protect their
airports from terrorist interference. A useful starting point in building a
uniform standard would be those mechanisms that have already been
proven effective for member nations. Despite the shortcomings and
incidents described above, some member nations have substantial rules
in place; they simply need to be more uniformly enforced.
Although the basic screening team has been discussed above, airport
security must be triggered even before a person approaches the screening
area; it must begin when a person purchases a ticket. For instance, a
former official in the U.S. Department of Transportation has observed
that passengers holding one-way tickets are searched far more
thoroughly and more often than those holding round-trip tickets. 99
Terrorists could easily determine this pattern and simply purchase round-
trip tickets, but obviously never utilize the return trip. Further, the
official also observed that anyone traveling in flight segments (i.e. with
92. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 71, at 2.
93. See WALLIS, supra note 1, at 68-69.
94. Id. at 74. The purpose of the twenty minute rotations is to minimize the
boredom associated with repeatedly doing the same task, thereby keeping team members
astute to their duties. Specifically, rotation prevents the person monitoring the video
display unit from becoming ineffective, as twenty minutes is considered the maximum





99. See Mary Schiavo, Flying Right: What it Takes to Make Aviation Safer and More
Secure After 2001, 14 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 279, 282 (2002).
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stopovers) is searched, but if the passenger's entire flight is booked with
the itinerary on all segments, the passenger is no longer subject to search
at each stop. 100 Thus, all passengers, regardless of the type of ticket they
hold, should be searched with equal force.
A search of each passenger prior to the screening point should occur
regularly as well. Screeners should be readily identifiable by the
uniforms they wear. An incident involving a a screener in Los Angeles,
who while in regular business attire asked passengers at a gate if they
had been screened, and subsequently allowed passengers to board the
plane,10 1 are inexcusable. If any of those passengers had been terrorists
and had managed to pass the screening point without being checked, they
were just provided an opportunity to murder. All screening stations must
ensure that every passenger is checked and that all screeners are easily
distinguishable; otherwise, any person, including a terrorist, could pose
as a screener and allow other terrorists to board an airplane.
Those who travel on commercial airlines expect some type of
limited search, usually involving a cursory inspection with a scan by a
metal detector. However, this procedure is not entirely safe because the
detectors cannot detect non-metallic guns or plastic explosives.
10 2
Therefore, other types of technology are needed, including imaging
devices that allow screeners to see through passenger clothing without
revealing anatomical details.
103
The precise procedures must be clear-cut and unequivocal. There
can be no room for doubt when something as serious as airport security
is in jeopardy. The standards must be easy to identify and must leave
nothing to interpretation. The regulations already in place for some
member nations are admirable in this respect, and they may be utilized in
crafting a uniform standard.
Before uniform standards can be implemented, however, member
nations must have the requisite number of employees. In addition, a
uniform standard of employment is also necessary in order to ensure that
dangerous individuals are not allowed to create dangerous situations
from within. The uniform system should set minimum requirements for
the number of individuals hired for training, re-training, screening points
and airports, as well as their language skills, and education levels.104
100. Id.
101. Id. at 283.
102. See Jason Lazarus, Note, Vision Impossible? Imaging Devices-The New Police
Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 48 FLA. L. REv. 299, 317 (1996), cited in Daniel
III, supra note 11, at 1634.
103. Daniel III, supra note 11, at 1634.
104. These minimum requirements are drawn from those set out in 49 U.S.C.S.
§ 44935.
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The TSA has set such employment standards in the U.S., which
include a "satisfactory" or better score on a screener selection exam,
citizenship or naturalization, fitness for duty, a background check, and
disqualification of individuals who could pose a security risk.' °5
Similarly, Australia requires a background security check. 10 6  TSA
employment standards also require the individual to possess a diploma or
G.E.D., have the visual and aural acuity necessary to perform physical
searches, distinguish between colors, and thoroughly manipulate and
handle baggage and other containers subject to security processing. 107
The U.S. regulations call for a proficiency in the English
language, 10 8 but in many countries, including Canada, several languages
are commonly spoken among security staff. Therefore, the Canadian
regulations provide guidance on the language proficiency requirement
because screening authorities there are required to "carry out screening
by means that effectively enable communication with members of the
public in the official language of their choice" and provide any printed or
pre-recorded material in that language if the material is used in the
screening process. 109 This rule is reasonable and important because
screeners must provide instructions and communicate with the
passengers in the language that the passengers speak. The Committee
should seriously consider requiring proficiency in the languages spoken
regularly in the airport because of the practical benefits such a
requirement would have in ensuring the safety of passengers. Other than
the language proficiency requirements, the qualifications established by
the TSA are similar to those in other member nations,' 10 so they present a
blueprint for formulating the uniform requirements.
Once selected based on the uniform criteria, employees must be
trained. The TSA again has admirable standards. At a minimum, a
screener must complete forty hours of classroom instruction, sixty hours
of on-the-job training, and pass an on-the-job training examination."'
105. Id. Anyone with a felony conviction in the ten year period prior to the check is
excluded from the possibility of employment. Fitness for duty also includes an absence
of dependency on drugs or alcohol. A preference for veterans is also expressed. Id.
106. See Pilots to Face Compulsory Security Checks, AUSTL. BROAD. CORP. NEWS,
Dec. 1, 2004, available at 2004 WL 101311594. A private investigative company will
perform the background checks. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. Proficiency must be such that the screener can read airline tickets, labels on
items to be screened, and identification credentials; write incident reports; and provide
answers and directions to all questions asked in English. Id.
109. See Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, SOR/2000-111, s.9. The
regulations applies to airports "where there is a significant demand from at least five
percent of the traveling public for services in either official language[.]"
110. See, e.g., Air Navigation Regulations, 2002, regs. 71-72 (Austl.).
111. See 49 U.S.C. § 44935 (2004).
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Similar requirements are in place for equipment use and proficiency in
recognizing new weapons and threats.1 12 Keeping screeners on pace with
terrorists as technology advances is critical because if a potential threat
goes unrecognized, the threat is realized. Further, to be effective, each
screener must know how to operate screening equipment properly.
Finally, if a member nation chooses to contract with private security
companies for the provision of screening services, as Canada has done
with some of its airports,' 13 the uniform training standards must be the
same for those private companies as well. The Committee must keep
this in mind when formulating uniform training standards.
Once the personnel are in place and trained, what powers should
they have, and what should they do? It is clear that all baggage should
be screened. Australia screens all checked bags,' 14 and the U.S. screens
all checked and carry-on luggage. 1 5 The U.S. and Australia also provide
for the screening of all passengers. 16 However, this was not always the
case in member nations; previously, Canada did not require the screening
of all passengers." 17 All baggage and all passengers must be screened,
because it only takes one unscreened terrorist or package to cause
another tragedy. The Committee should note this and author a uniform
standard accordingly.
Although the items that screeners should look for and confiscate
would seem evident, without a uniform standard, what is allowed and
what is forbidden will continue to vary. No weapons" 8 or explosive
material 19 should be allowed to pass through the screening process.
Passengers who do not consent to the screening of themselves 120 and
112. Id.
113. See Stephen Cretier, Garda Announces New Material Agreements, CAN.
STOCKWATCH, Jan. 14, 2005, available at 2005 WL 60284835. The private company
Garda became responsible for airport screening and security at eighteen regional airports
in Canada. Id.
114. Air Security, SUNDAY TEL. (S. Wales), Jan. 2, 2005, at 13, available at 2005 WL
56886714. Not surprisingly, not all bags were previously screened.
115. 49 U.S.C.S. § 44901 (2004) ("screening of all passengers and property
including ... carry on and checked baggage, and other articles that will be carried aboard
a passenger aircraft").
116. Id. See also Air Navigation Act, 2002, § 20 (Austl.).
117. See Aeronautics Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-2, cited in Suijit Choudhry and Kent
Roach, Racial and Ethnics Profiling: Statutory Discretion, Constitutional Remedies, and
Democratic Accountability, 41 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1, 8 (2003).
118. See 49 U.S.C. § 44901 (2004); Air Navigation Act, 2002, § 22 (Austl.).
119. See 49 U.S.C. § 44901 (2004). The U.S. regulations provide for either the use of
explosive detection systems or alternative means for screening checked baggage. One
alternative means is ensuring that no checked bags are loaded into the cargo hold unless
the passenger who checked the bag has boarded the plane. Others include a manual
search, bomb-sniffing dogs, or any other approved means or technology. Id.
120. Id. at § 44902 (providing mandatory refusal of passengers who do not consent to
searches of themselves and their property). See also Canadian Aviation Security
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their baggage' 21 must not pass through security. To this end, the
screeners need the authority to require identification, 122 to require a
person to remove outer clothing in order to screen that person
properly,12 3 to require a passenger to undergo a frisk search, 124 and to
detain (and physically restrain, if necessary) anyone the screener suspects
"is committing or has committed" an offense endangering airport
security. 125
There are other considerations that the Committee must keep in
mind when developing the uniform standard. The use of identity cards
and biometrics has the potential to vastly decrease the potential for
terrorist access to secure areas. The U.S. has requirements for the use of
biometric technology in accessing controlled airport areas,126 and Canada
is implementing such data in controlling access to restricted areas.
127
Australia will ground regional airlines that fail to issue identification
cards to all employees. 128 The Australian security cards must include the
Regulations, SOR/2000-1 11, § 10 (preventing anyone who refuses to allow a search of
their person or property from passing through security).
121. Air Navigation Act, 2002, § 22C (Austl.).
122. See Air Navigation Regulations, 2002, reg. 55 (Austl.). The regulation provides
that a security officer "may" request a person to produce identification when the officer
"reasonably believes" that person has committed, is committing, or will commit an act
offensive to airport security. Id. The act also requires that the officer asking for the
person's identification must first present his or her own identification card. Id. The
author's position is that a screener should be given authority to ask for identification
without any such qualifications or restrictions, other than producing a valid identification
card when asked.
123. See Aviation Transport Security Act, 2004, § 95 (Austl.). The act only allows
for a screener to "request" a person to remove an item of clothing; a screener must not
require the person to do so. Id. It is the author's view that the screeners need to be given
the power to require the passenger to do so.
124. See Aviation Transport Security Act, 2004, § 95B (Austl.). The Act allows
screeners to "request" passengers to undergo a frisk search and state that screeners must
not "require" passengers to submit to a frisk search. Id. However, it is again the author's
view that screeners must be authorized to require passengers to do so.
125. Id. at § 96.
126. See 49 U.S.C. § 44903 (2004). The regulation calls for TSA officials to consult
with representatives from the airline industry, biometrics identifier industry, and the
National Institute of Standards and Technology, to establish a set of technical system
requirements and standards for biometrics use to control access to secure airport areas.
By gaining such perspectives, the system developed would be secure, reliable, and
effective. Id. Further objectives of this meeting include: developing a list of biometric
identifier products and dealers as well as procedures for implementing such equipment;
taking all possible precautions against false positives and false negatives, and mandating
a process and timeline for getting all of this in place. Id.
127. See Airport Employees Will Soon Have to Present Their Biometric Data-
Fingerprints or Eye Scans-Before Gaining Access, BROAD. NEWS (Montreal), Oct. 16,
2004, available at 2004 WL 95965616.
128. See Anti-Terror Upgrade for Airlines, DAILY TEL. (Sydney), Dec. 1, 2004, at
A28, available at 2004 WL 100855522.
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name of the screener, his or her recent photo, an identification number,
and an expiration date. 29 Requiring airport security personnel to have
identification cards and using biometrics to limit access to secure areas
of the airport could keep terrorists out of restricted areas and save lives.
The Committee would do well to recognize the merits of identification
cards.
After formulating a basic system, the Committee need only
formulate a way of assessing its effectiveness and preventing individuals
who present terrorist threats from passing through and devise a scheme
of penalties or punishments for member nations that do not comply with
the Security Council's decision. The U.S. model is typical, requiring
periodic assessments to determine vulnerabilities, and allowing the TSA
to conduct unannounced inspections.1 30  Considering the massive and
revolutionary nature of a uniform airport security standard, the
Committee must be aware of the importance of initial and continued
testing of the system at all places of implementation. Enduring diligence
is required to stop terrorism.
The U.S. regulations also provide a useful tool in determining a
uniform standard for penalties. The TSA requires an assessment of
foreign airport security. 13 1 If the foreign airport does not meet the TSA's
standards, U.S. actions include publishing the identity of the airport in
the Federal Register, prominently displaying it at all U.S. airports at
which common airlines arrive regularly, and notifying the media of the
airport's identity. 132 The regulations also allow the president to forbid
any airline from providing service between that foreign airport and any
U.S. airport. 133 In fact, the regulations further provide that the president
has the authority to cut off foreign assistance to the country in which the
airport is located.1 34 The United Nations has the potential to magnify
such sanctions against member nations with non-compliant airports.
With the prospect of cutting off essentially an entire world's aid to a
129. See Air Navigation Regulations, 2002, reg. 95A (Austl.). To obtain such a card,
an individual must verify his or her identity by providing two forms of identification, and
must not have a criminal record causing his or her employment to be adverse to the
interests of airport security. Id.
130. See 49 U.S.C. § 44916 (2004). The TSA is also instructed to perform audits of
these assessments periodically. Id.
131. Id. § 44907 (2004).
132. Id. The Secretary of Transportation is instructed to perform such assessments at
foreign airports from which foreign airlines serve the U.S. or "which pose a high risk of
introducing danger to international air travel." Id. The Secretary is to carry out the
assessment in consultation with appropriate authorities of the nation in which the airport
is located, as well as with representatives of each carrier serving the airport. Id.
133. Id.
134. See 49 U.S.C. § 44908 (2004). The President is required to suspend any
assistance provided under either the Foreign Assistance Act or the Arms Control Act. Id.
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country, or forbidding virtually any airline to fly into an airport, such a
scheme of penalties would almost certainly command compliance.
Although the above measures are not nearly sufficient or exhaustive
to provide a complete system for a uniform standard of airport security,
they present a tenable framework that the Security Council's Counter
Terrorism Committee could utilize to prepare such a standard.
IV. Conclusion
If the Security Council were to provide a standard for airport
security, member nations would experience two significant effects: first,
government funds related to the expense of developing and monitoring
airport security would be available for other use; and second, and more
important, member nations would be assured that terrorists were both
prevented from endangering aviation security and punished for those
security breaches to the fullest extent.
There would be significant monetary benefits to such a plan as well.
The United States could stand to save part of the $4.8 billion that was the
TSA's budget for its first full year of funding in 2003.135 Additionally,
passengers would see a nominal monetary benefit because the TSA
would no longer require all U.S. and foreign airlines to collect the $2.50
security fee surcharge for each flight segment originating at a United
States airport. 
136
It could be said that truly collective security may be an unrealistic
aspiration for the United Nations. Collective security, as embodied in
the U.N. Charter, was premised on a willingness of states to cede control
to the United Nations in order to protect other member nations. 137 It was
also based on member nations foregoing their rights to enforce their
interests in ways chosen by them.138 It has been noted by some that is
unlikely that there will be a substantial shift in the attitudes of member
nations on these issues. 139 However, it is this author's belief that if the
United Nations Security Council can demonstrate its ability to develop
135. See THE U.S. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 14, at
37.
136. Id. This benefit may not be fully realized, however, as each nation's
governmental organization dealing with airport security will still be required to fund its
own security. Nevertheless, the government will not spend as much on developing the
system because the U.N. will have done so.
137. See Martii Koskenniemi, The Place of Law in Collective Security, 17 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 455,463-64 (1996).
138. See Karl Doehring, Collective Security, in 1 UNITED NATIONS: LAW, POLICIES,
AND PRACTICE 110 (Rumudiger Wolfrum, ed., 1995).
139. See Helmut Freudenschuss, Between Unilateralism and Collective Security:
Authorization of the Use of Force by the UN Security Council, 5 EuRO. J. INT'L L. 492,
530 (1994).
[Vol. 24:3
CHANGING OF THE GUARD
an effective uniform standard of airport security for United Nations
member nations, especially given many member nations' inability to
construct such programs for themselves, member nations will work with
the Council to bring about a global system of uniform airport security.
The United States must be on board for such a revolutionary action
if it is to have a chance for acceptance and legitimacy throughout the
world. According to Richard Holbrooke, who negotiated the Dayton
Accords that ended the war in Bosnia in 1995, "the U.N. is only as good
as the U.S. commitment, and the U.N. cannot succeed if the U.S. does
not support it. ' ' 140 In fact, in the Security Council, the U.S. is very much
the dominant power, and its active support is required for major
decisions.' 4' When the U.S. leads a particular initiative at the U.N., it is
nearly always followed by U.N. member nations.1
42
Thus, the United States must recognize that airport security is not
merely a domestic matter, but truly an international problem.
International cooperation, through the U.N. Security Council, is
necessary if any country, not just the U.S., is to have any hope of
combating terrorism. Fortunately, the United States' view on the
importance of the Security Council appears positive, "Working with the
U.N. system helps us better leverage our political [and] financial...
capabilities, so as to be ready to respond to any new challenges that
arise.' ' 143 The prospects for peace would be advanced significantly if
member nations recognize that the Security Council is the appropriate
institution to handle international security issues.' 44 Thus, the United
States would benefit by recognizing its obligation to cooperate and
consult with the Council to develop a uniform airport security
standard.1
45
Further, U.S. regulations require the Secretary of State to work
toward a multilateral agreement that strengthens standards for airport
security and enforcement measures. 146 With this responsibility in mind,
the author feels that, given a strong showing by the Security Council in
its decision to provide and require adherence to a system of uniform
airport security, the United States would commit to working with the
Counter Terrorism Committee towards both its own compliance and that
140. FASULO, supra note 56, at 10.
141. See id. at41.
142. Id. at 11.
143. Kim R. Holmes, The U.S. Role in the United Nations, Remarks Before the
Defense Orientation Conference Association (Oct. 13, 2003), available at
http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rm/2003/26040.htm (cited in Suy, supra note 60, at 25) (last
visited Oct. 23, 2005).
144. See Shenk, supra note 79, at 281.
145. Id.
146. See 49 U.S.C. § 44910 (2004).
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of other nations.
In the endeavor to develop a uniform airport security system, the
support of the Secretary General will also be of monumental importance.
Kofi Annan is one of the most influential international figures in recent
memory.1 47 If he prioritizes an issue, "the U.N. system and the world in
general pay much more attention than if the U.N. passes some dreary
resolution."1 48 Therefore, Secretary General Annan should influence the
member nations to initiate discussions in the Security Council regarding
this important matter.
The path towards a uniform standard for airport security will not be
easy, nor will it be quick, neither in conception nor in implementation.
However, if the Security Council committed itself to providing a
standard, its authority to require adherence thereto and its dedication to
helping member nations achieve compliance would enable airline
passengers around the world to find themselves flying friendlier and
safer skies.
147. See FASULO, supra note 56, at 29.
148. Id.
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